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Correspondence theories of truth claim that truth involves a relationship between ideas in the mind and 
facts in the world, but because minds are viewed as being disconnected from the world, there is no 
way to determine whether beliefs are true or false under the correspondence view. For truth to be a 
meaningful concept, a theory about it must conceive of it in a way that is meaningful for humans. By 
looking at Heidegger’s ideas about phenomenology and humans as Dasein I argue for a framework 
that does not rest on a Cartesian subject/object dualism, and instead grounds concepts, like truth, in 
experience. I then turn to William James’ pragmatic theory of truth as “what works” and argue that it 







In Experimental Phenomenology, Don Idhe makes the observation that pragmatism 
and phenomenology are both “philosophies of experience” (Idhe 115). Both reject 
Cartesianism and Platonic questions about existence (Idhe 117) and are instead 
concerned with human experience in the world. A difference that he observes 
between the two is that pragmatism is oriented towards action (Idhe 117), while 
phenomenology is concerned with description (Idhe 118). Rather than seeing this 
difference as grounds for separating phenomenology from pragmatism, Idhe suggests 
that a complementary “postphenomenology” is possible (Idhe 118). Following Idhe, I 
contend that while phenomenology provides a basis for philosophical inquiry, 
concepts which have a practical value, such as truth, are best understood with the 
application of a pragmatic lens. 
 
To make my contention I will look at truth in particular and argue that it is a concept 
that must be approached phenomenologically and should be conceived in pragmatic 
terms. To do this, I will first critique Bertrand Russell’s portrayal of the correspondence 
view of truth as resting on an untenable Cartesian dualism. Then I will look at Martin 
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Heidegger’s conception of the phenomenological method as providing grounds for 
human philosophical inquiry, and at his views on human understanding being an 
interpretation of our projects in the world. Following this, I will argue that the 
pragmatic notion of truth, as articulated by William James, provides a meaningful 
conception of truth for humans in the world. 
 
Similar to common sense notions is the correspondence theory of truth. In his defense 
of correspondence, Bertrand Russell lists three conditions that must be met by a theory 
of truth. First, he says that any theory must also account for what is meant by falsehood. 
If truth is to be a meaningful term, a theory about it needs to admit that not everything 
can be true. Whatever “truth” is, its opposite must be falsehood (Russell 277). Second, 
he says that “truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements” (Russell 
278). He does this to differentiate truth from “fact”. Facts apply to extant material 
things, but truth applies to the mind. A fact just is. There can be no false facts, but the 
beliefs held by a mind can be either true or false. His third condition involves the 
relationship between the beliefs and facts. Facts are in the world and beliefs are about 
things in the world (Russell 278).   
 
The three conditions lead Russell to propose that “truth consists in some form of 
correspondence between belief and fact” (Russell 278). A belief is true when the image 
or sense a mind has about a fact is the same as the fact in the world; when the two differ 
the belief is false. There is a problem here which Russell acknowledges. He says that 
“if truth consists in a correspondence of thought with something outside of thought, 
thought can never know when truth has been attained” (Russell 278). For Russell, this 
means that correspondence correctly explains what truth is, but it is ultimately not 
possible to test whether a belief is true or false. 
 
Russell’s account of truth as correspondence implies a Cartesian duality which makes 
truth an unusable concept. As evidenced by his distinction of material facts and mental 
beliefs, his theory rests on the assumption that there is an objective world external to 
the subjective mind. The mind might have a belief about the world that reflects how the 
world actually is, in which case the belief is true, but because the two are detached, the 
subjective mind can never be sure that the belief actually reflects the world, so it is not 
possible for the mind to ever know if its beliefs are true or false. As long as truth is 
conceived in such a way, the best that can be said about any proposition or belief is: “It 
might be true, and it might not, we don’t know.”  
  
“Truth” which is unusable is especially problematic given that truth is a word which 
has practical value, in that our lives are greatly affected by what we see as true or false. 
This is seen in all sorts of cases, from everyday activity to matters of national 
importance. If I believe it is true that a certain film is being shown at a local theater, 
then I may attempt to go see the film. Conversely, if policy makers believe that theories 
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about anthropogenic climate change are false, then they are unlikely to take any 
measures against climate change. 
 
A theory of truth can account for the practical importance given to the word when it is 
recognized that the Cartesian assumption is unnecessary and untenable. The 
subjective/objective dichotomy rests on the maxim that nothing can be known outside 
of consciousness. However, it goes on to posit the existence of a world which is 
inaccessible to consciousness. Given the first premise, the second is unjustifiable. It is 
still possible for the external world to exist, but since it is by definition unknowable, 
humans can make no justifiable statements about it. A claim about truth, or anything 
else for that matter, must be based on what can be experienced. Phenomenology begins 
with experience, and, by avoiding Cartesian dualism, it can be used to define truth in a 
meaningful and usable way.   
 
Heideggerian phenomenology looks at human experience of the world and sees the 
ways in which we can talk about the world as being based on those experiences. 
Heidegger rejects the notion that we can talk about something which exists, but which 
is detached from experience. Rather than viewing phenomenology as a school of 
thought, Heidegger first identifies phenomenology as a “methodological conception” 
(Heidegger 278). That is, phenomenology tells us how to approach a given question. 
 
To get at what it is to do phenomenology, Heidegger breaks the word down into its 
morphemes “phenomenon” and “logos” (Heidegger 279). Phenomenon is related to 
“light.” Things become revealed when they are lit, likewise, a phenomenon is “that 
which shows itself in itself, the manifest” (Heidegger 279). Phenomena are what reveal 
themselves to us or could reveal themselves to us. However, the first thing to consider 
is not what is being revealed, but how it is being revealed. After revealing itself in a 
certain way (how), an object is determined to resemble something (what) (Heidegger 
279). However, what it is seen to resemble is not what it really is (we cannot say what it 
really is, only what it “seems” like). This second thing (the what or seeming like), 
Heidegger calls “semblance”, and he distinguishes it from phenomenon (Heidegger 
280). For this reason, phenomenology leaves open the question of what something is 
and refers to how something is revealing (or can reveal) itself. 
 
Relating to the term “logos”, Heidegger translates it as “discourse” (Heidegger 282). 
Like light again, discourse “‘lets something be seen’” (Heidegger 282). Discourse is 
speaking (Hediegger 283) which brings to light more information, more concepts, and 
more ways of seeing things. When one speaks about something, there is the speaker, the 
act of speaking (the Greek term Heidegger uses is legein), and the thing spoken about 
(legomenon). The legomenon is the substrate of the discourse (i.e. the something which 
reveals itself before it is spoken about), and the speaker, the self, stands in relation to 
the legomenon. Thus, logos as discourse is conceived as a relationship. 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                          Novak | 139 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
Combining the phenomenon which reveals itself and the discourse about the 
phenomenon yields “phenomenology.” The purpose of phenomenology is “to let that 
which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from 
itself” (Heidegger 284). Thus, doing phenomenology means describing (i.e. bringing 
into consciousness through discourse) how things reveal themselves to us (i.e. how 
phenomena is encountered). 
 
Phenomenological method and Heideggerian terminology provide a new vocabulary 
and framework for approaching the topic of truth. Unlike in Russell, there is no object 
which stands in relation to the subject, but which is ultimately admitted to be 
unknowable and inaccessible to the subject. A relationship still exists, but it is between 
the speaker and the legomenon; and the legomenon is known and accessible to the 
speaker because it has revealed itself to the speaker. 
 
Insofar as speaking is phenomenological, it would presently seem that discourse about 
any topic, truth or otherwise, would have to be limited to descriptions about 
phenomena. However, Heidegger sees phenomenology as also being interpretive. In 
order to elucidate the interpretive aspect of phenomenology, I will discuss Heidegger’s 
conception of human Being-in-the-world. The move from description of phenomena to 
interpretation of phenomena by humans will provide the means and context for looking 
at James’ pragmatic theory of truth. 
 
Phenomenology has been defined as speaking about phenomena; but it has not yet been 
made clear how phenomena reveal themselves, or to whom they reveal themselves. It is 
humans in “the world” who are encountering phenomena and doing phenomenology. 
Heidegger uses the term “Dasein” to describe human existence, or “Being-in-the-
world”. “The world” here refers to where Dasein lives (Heidegger 289). Living in the 
world means having “dealings in the world and with entities within-the-world” 
(Heidegger 291). Entities are the various naturally occurring, human made, and living 
“things” that we encounter (Heidegger 289). Things are not encountered from a 
disinterested theoretical standpoint. Living as having dealings means that things are 
always encountered with some purpose in mind, or some concern. Heidegger’s example 
is that a door handle is not just encountered as something simply there, but as a means 
for opening a door in order to, say, meet someone. His term for these things we 
encounter that concern us is “equipment” (Heidegger 292). 
 
Equipment reveals itself to us in a variety of ways. As equipment, it is “ready-to-hand”, 
which means that rather than being thought about and understood theoretically, it is just 
used. Heidegger’s example is that a hammer only shows itself as a hammer when it is 
used for hammering. When equipment is being used properly it “withdraws” from our 
concern (Heidegger 293). For example, a hammer that is hammering is being used to 
drive a nail, which could be one step in building a house. In that case the concern is 
with creating living space, and not with the hammer. All projects are like the example 
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above in that the equipment employed is in a relational “arrangement” (Heidegger 293). 
A hammer is only a hammer in relation to a nail, or a pen is only a pen when there is a 
surface to write on. The relationship can be seen further by considering the raw 
materials and manufacturing equipment that goes into things like hammers and pens. 
However, considering equipment in theoretical ways, such as how it is arranged, is not 
prior to our practical encounter with it. The default way of encountering things is ready-
to-hand. Neutrally encountering them in a way that they can be theorized about without 
concern, or to use Heidegger’s term, encountering them as “present-at-hand” 
(Heidegger 295), takes place afterward. 
 
In order to encounter entities as present-at-hand, there must be some disturbance in 
their readinesss-to-hand. There are three ways which equipment becomes unusable, or 
un-ready-to-hand. One way is for it to become “conspicuous” (Heidegger 296). As I’m 
typing, my concern is with writing this paper, and my keyboard is ready-to-hand for 
doing so, but if the keyboard were to break, then it would become present-at-hand. It 
would no longer be equipment for writing, it would just be there, and through this 
conspicuous being there I would become aware of it as just being there, whereas before 
it had been withdrawn in its being there for writing. Similarly, if the keyboard had been 
missing from the start, then I would have been aware of its absence, and all the other 
equipment that I do have access to would have become “obtrusive”, meaning that even 
though it is still usable, it is present-at-hand in that it is unusable for my purposes 
(Heidegger 296). Finally, there can be “obstinancy” (Heidegger 297), an example of 
which would be if the keyboard were covered and the cover had to be moved before the 
keyboard could be used. In this case my attention would be toward the keyboard, but it 
would be temporarily made present-at-hand by the necessity of first moving the cover. 
The presence-at-hand in the three instances mentioned would not last long and concern 
would never disappear entirely. Readiness-to-hand would reappear as soon as I 
attempted to repair, uncover, or find a new keyboard. However, the disturbance in the 
original readiness-to-hand and emergence of the presence-at-hand marks the arrival of 
the possibility for encountering things neutrally and for thinking about the projects 
which the things are tied up in (Heidegger 297). All this is to say that our orientation in 
the world is through our projects, and phenomena reveal themselves to us in different 
ways depending on which projects we are engaged in. Therefore, phenomena is 
interpreted in a particular way, but the possibility for reinterpretation is present in the 
present-at-hand.   
 
The interpreted way in which things are encountered and reencountered means that 
“phenomenology of Dasein…is a hermeneutic” (Heidegger 286). The hermeneutic 
characteristic of phenomenology allows two things to be made explicit. First, what is 
being revealed is also hidden (Heidegger 284-285). Phenomena as ready-to-hand hides 
its presence-at-hand. Seeing a hammer as a thing for hammering conceals the hammer 
as a thing which just is wooden, metallic, etc. This hiddenness leads Heidegger to say 
that: “Higher than actuality stands possibility. We can understand phenomenology only 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                          Novak | 141 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
by seizing upon it as a possibility” (Heidegger 287). When phenomena reveal 
themselves they do so through an interpretation. The ever present possibility of 
presence-at-hand means that a reinterpretation is always possible and phenomenology 
must recognize this. 
 
Heideggerian phenomenology grounds philosophical discourse in the context of how 
experiences are interpreted. Conceiving of humans as Dasein reveals the close link 
between phenomenology and pragmatic experience. Our interpretation and description 
of phenomena is based on our being as Being-in-the world. Because humans always 
have some concern with the world, truth must be conceived of and encountered in a 
way that it relates to our projects in the world. 
 
In Pragmatism, William James gives an account of truth which is grounded in 
pragmatic experience and is not concerned with the relationship between belief and an 
unknowable objective reality. Considering the correspondence view, James initially 
says that truth as commonly conceived “is a property of certain of our ideas. It means 
their ‘agreement’…with ‘reality’” (James 291). The problem with this first comes about 
when we consider the term “agreement”. 
 
Agreement is popularly understood as “copy”, i.e. an idea about something agrees with 
it, when the idea is a mental copy of the object (James 291). James says to imagine a 
mechanical clock. The image of the face of the clock is probably close to a copy, but 
unless you’re a clockmaker, the interior of the clock is largely hidden from your 
understanding. How is it possible to think about a clock or anything else when parts of 
it remain hidden? 
 
The pragmatist approaches this question by asking:  
 
Grant an idea or belief to be true…what concrete difference will its being true 
make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? What experiences 
will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, 
in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential terms? (James 292)  
 
Continuing with the clock example, even if I do not know the inner workings of it, I can 
still identify or misidentify “x” as “clock” if I use the pragmatic method. It is easy to 
imagine the consequences of someone correctly vs. incorrectly identifying something as 
a clock. If someone correctly believes that “x” is “a clock” the individual will be able to 
go to the right place for the right amount of time. If the belief is false, then any number 
of things (e.g. interactions with others or the position of celestial bodies) will conflict 
with the original belief. 
  
Considering the pragmatic questions raised above, James says the pragmatist’s answer 
to them is: “True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and 
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verify.  False ideas are those that we cannot” (James 292). James explains the concepts 
of verification and validation by saying that ideas are verified when they agree with 
other ideas and experiences (James 292). By answering the questions in this way, 
pragmatism conceives of truth in terms wholly different than those given by the 
correspondence theory. Truth and the means for determining truth are not wholly 
separate. For the pragmatist, truth is only a relevant concept insofar as it is 
determinable and workable.   
 
Use and truth are directly linked for James. He says that something “is useful because 
it is true” or “it is true because it is useful” (James 293). Indirect practical verification 
through use is by and large the most common form of truth making, but a more direct 
method of verification always underlies it (James 294). We don’t have to study the 
inner workings of every clock we see to verify that it is a clock; so long as we are 
able to use it to check the time of day with “no frustration or contradiction”, then we 
have a practical verification that it is a clock. The key part of practical verification is 
“use”; when we use something, we’re experiencing it in such a way that it serves 
some function (James 293). Often the underlying direct verification is done by 
another. For an entity to truly become a clock, somebody had to get the necessary 
parts, assemble them in the right order, and test that they kept time the same as other 
already known clocks. 
 
Truth as use seems like a suitable meaning of truth for Being-in-the-world. Pragmatic 
truth is only an applicable concept when it has to do with the world and our 
understanding of it. An interpretation of an idea as being true or false depends on how 
the idea stands in relation to our interpretation of the world. If the idea coheres to our 
understanding of the world, then it is true for us, if not, then it is false. This does not 
mean that truth is purely relative and anything goes. Because the world is understood 
through our concern with projects, ideas and their implication must further those 
projects. Coherence breaks down when unreadiness-to-hand presents itself, and 
theorizing can provide the possibility for reinterpretation of the world. 
 
The possibility for change means that temporality is part of the process for determining 
an idea’s truth. Ideas are not inherently true; instead “truth happens to an idea. It 
becomes true, is made true by events” (James 292). Truth applies to the original idea, 
but truth only becomes a property of the idea after verification. Because the world is 
always revealing new parts of itself and there is always the possibility for something 
new to be seen, our conception of what is true should always open to revision and 
should never be held as an absolute. 
 
James’ and Heidegger’s views on verification and readiness-to-hand lend themselves to 
one another. Similar to the way in which concern for equipment withdraws when it is 
ready-to-hand, verification is usually pragmatic and the deeper verification is only 
implicit. For a clock to reveal itself, it had to be made, but recognizing it as a clock 
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does not require knowledge about clock-making. If a thing is used to check the time, 
then it is implicitly recognized as a clock, although the concern is toward the time and 
not the clock. Likewise, “frustration or contradiction” in James and un-readiness-to-
hand in Heidegger both serve as the mechanism by which some revision or theorizing 
arises. Beliefs about, and encounters with, the world are true when they enable us to 
continue our projects, and a disruption in our projects can produce reflection which 
reveals something to be false, thereby creating the possibility for a more useful 
understanding of what is true. For example, the belief in circular planetary orbits was 
supported by centuries of observation, but advents in optical technology made the 
circular models inadequate. This led Kepler to devise a model of planetary motion 
using elliptical orbits. Kepler’s model proved to be more useful in astronomy, which 
made it true, and the old models being incoherent with the new, became false. 
 
Phenomenology lets us describe the way things reveal themselves to us. Seeing phenomena 
in the context of Being-in-the-world both grounds and limits that which can be said. The 
grounding is in the experience of the world and the world is the limit. Humans live in the 
world and are concerned with it, which means that humans are always interpreting the 
world and are oriented in it a certain way. Given projects and the necessity of 
interpretation, viewing something as true must take those things into consideration. Moving 
from descriptive phenomenology to an explicitly pragmatic outlook preserves experience 
and works in the context of our orientation in the world. This combination of 
phenomenology and pragmatism can be seen as a postphenomenology, which is capable of 
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